Reading on governing AI agents, and where each piece meets the map.
This set is one line of the research programme of the Financial Services AI Enterprise Hub at Capgemini, on how a regulated firm delegates work to AI agents and keeps the licence to act in its own hands. The list is wide on purpose: research on governing agents and delegated authority, what supervisors and standards bodies expect, knowledge and provenance, coordination, where agents are going, and people and automation, with the Hub’s own papers among them. Each piece has one line on where it meets the map. The list stays open: to suggest a paper, write to the Hub. The empirical claims on this site, with their sources, are on the sources page.
The reading list
Work from the fields below, each checked against its publisher’s page in October 2026, with one line on where it meets the map. The figures quoted on this site are on the sources page.
Governing agents
Identifiers, real-time monitoring, and activity logs as the three levers of visibility; the set’s e1, p5, and w5, with the mandate added as the fourth.
The systems outside the agent that attribute, shape, and remedy its actions; the control plane is one such infrastructure, inside one firm.
The parties of the agent lifecycle and baseline practices for each; the set assigns those practices to boxes with owners.
Agents read through agency law and the principal-agent problem; the mandate on the map is a principal’s instruction made machine-readable.
Agent benchmarks ignore cost and reproducibility; the set’s evaluations at p6 are run by a team that did not build the agent, with cost beside accuracy.
On a SWE-bench Verified subset the harness explained 7.8 times more variance than the model; so the firm approves a release, never a model (part three).
Agency as a matter of degree, with harms that grow as goals get less specified and impact more direct; why autonomy is granted level by level.
Autonomy, efficacy, goal complexity, and generality as the dimensions of an agent; the labels of the ladder A.0 to A.5.
The risks to people rise with each level of autonomy; A.5 is the level no evidence condition allows.
Why an agent can be right at every step and wrong as a whole: the failure the loop, the current-state input of the check, and situation card 5 are built against.
Knowing, saying, and doing as layers of governance, and a circuit breaker that stops an act on a basis below standing: the check at w4.
How human-agent loops build software, with verified outcomes, auditable evidence, and verification gates: the release at w1, the harness at p1, evaluations at p6.
Delegated authority
Scoped, traceable authority granted by a person to an agent, on OAuth and OpenID; the set’s identity at p1 and entitlements at p3, under the mandate at w3.
Existing identity and authorization standards applied to agents; the platform row of the map in a standards body’s words.
Five overlays on SP 800-53, two of them for single-agent and multi-agent systems; the platform controls the set leaves to the CISO.
Instructions planted in what an agent retrieves take over what it does; why the check reads the act and its basis itself, whatever the agent declares.
Prompt injection and excessive agency at the head of the practitioners’ list (LLM01 and LLM06); the guardrails at p4 and the entitlements at p3.
Supervisors on AI in finance
Third-party dependence, concentration, and cyber risk as the system-level questions; the set stays inside one firm and names those as the layer above it.
Governance, model risk, data, and third parties as the gaps supervisors see; four of the set’s essentials, with the mandate and the loop missing from the list.
How existing insurance rules apply to AI, proportionately; the row of part four’s law slide that the motor case reads.
The AI Act’s high-risk rules set against banking law, with no significant contradiction found; the ground for the credit cases’ law rows.
Securities supervisors on AI in trading, advice, and operations, and the risks they see; the ground for the capital-markets case, beside the EBA’s view for banks.
Firm-level benefits and risks and how they become systemic; the firm-level half is what the map governs.
Model identification, governance, development, validation, and risk mitigants; model risk validates the release at w1 and the evaluations at p6.
A risk-based approach to model risk that leaves generative and agentic AI to the bank’s own risk management; the register quotes the footnote (row 10).
Standards, audit, and assurance
Govern, map, measure, and manage as the functions of AI risk management; the enterprise row of the map in a framework’s words.
A management system for AI that can be certified; the owners, the register, and the reviews on the map, as an auditor of the standard would sample them.
An end-to-end framework for internal algorithmic audit; the evidence base at e5 and the record at w5 are what such an audit samples.
Governance, model, and application audits as three layers; the map’s three rows, audited in turn.
Knowledge, provenance, and retrieval
Entities, activities, and agents as the grammar of provenance; the first thing a claim carries, in a standard’s terms.
Retrieval paired with generation; what p2 does, and what the set says it cannot do alone: find the version that applies.
Models read the start and the end of a long input and lose the middle; why the agent receives a bounded package of claims and never the library.
A claim checked against evidence that supports or refutes it; the claim grain, in the literature where it was first worked at scale.
Whether a generated statement is attributable to an identified source; the test the record at w5 answers for every premise of an act.
Why fluent output is no evidence; the record keeps the claims an act relied on, and never the model’s prose as a source.
Language models and knowledge graphs combined; the knowledge estate at e2 as structured, versioned claims beside the model.
The lifecycle that keeps knowledge fit to act on, the decay classes, and why a model’s own output never re-enters as an independent source: chapter 05, how knowledge is prepared.
The claim and its standing on two axes, admissibility computed per act against the consequence tier’s bar, and the signed manifest: the set’s second rule.
The type system beneath the claims, and how it stays versionable and transferable between domains.
Governed claims over stored documents, traceable provenance over trusted sources, and preserved contradictions over forced consensus: the values behind chapter 05.
Coordination above one act
Coordination as the management of dependencies between activities; what a cohort of agents needs once no single mandate holds the limit.
Insects coordinating through the traces their work leaves behind; the record at w5 and the knowledge at w2 as the medium agents read.
Miscoordination, conflict, and collusion among agents as distinct risks; the cohorts and cascades the map does not draw yet.
Navigation on a ship as cognition spread across people, instruments, and records; the record and the register as part of how a firm thinks.
Organisational intelligence as map, physics, and player: the frame around the knowledge plane.
Intelligence as a property of the medium the units coordinate through: what the loop at w6 feeds, and what lies above one act.
Accountability scoped by consequence class, and containment as multi-agent: e1, e4, p4, and w6, and what the map does not draw yet.
Where the agents are going
Agents that plan by predicting the consequences of their acts in a learned world model; the fifth card of what the map does not draw yet.
I-JEPA, the first of the line; a predicted consequence enters the check as one more claim with a standing.
V-JEPA, the same idea on video; the map does not move when the architecture does.
People and automation
Four stages and ten levels of automation; the ancestor of every autonomy ladder, the set’s A.0 to A.5 included (A.5 as the end no evidence condition allows).
The more a system is automated, the more skilled and less practised its supervisor; the people slide of part four, forty years early.
Reliance calibrated to what automation can actually do; the standing an act needs is set by its consequence, never by the agent’s confidence.
Control that tracks human reasons and traces to a responsible person; the mandate with a named owner, and the record that names who decided.
Forty-one oversight policies that ask a person to catch what a person cannot; why the set makes human in the loop two jobs, deciding referrals and reviewing samples.
The ladder
The levels of autonomy A.0 to A.5 descend from the levels of automation of Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens, and their labels are from Kasirzadeh and Gabriel (Nature, August 2026). Pairing each with a level of evidence, K0 to K3, under the rule that autonomy may not rise above evidence, and listing the overhang as the conditions not yet met, each with an owner, an assessor, and whether it blocks, is the set’s own proposal, under review for the reference model, and not yet shown to predict acceptable risk.
Above one act
What the map does not draw yet are agents delegating, cohorts, cascades, other firms’ agents coordinating through the traces they leave, and agents built to predict the consequences of their own acts. The first four belong to the literature on coordination listed above, and the fifth to the world-model line of work. Around an agent an institution builds three things: the medium the units coordinate through, the membranes that test what an act depends on, and a sizing rule that grants no mandate larger than the organisation around it can absorb, check, and correct.
Delegation: one agent hands work to another, and the questions are whose mandate the second acts under, which check reads it, and whether the record of the first names the second. Cohorts: several agents on one process, each inside its own limit, together over a limit none of them holds; three elections on one issuer is the case in the situation cards. Cascades: one agent changes the state another reasons over, and a third’s act conflicts with both, so nothing any one of them did was wrong and the firm’s position is. And the agent’s own foresight: today’s agents infer the next token, and the next ones are being built to carry a world model, like JEPA, and to plan an act by predicting what it will do. The map does not move for that. A predicted consequence enters the check as one more claim with a standing, and the record keeps what the agent expected beside what happened.
The first four coordinate the way ants and termites do, through traces. No agent sees the whole picture and none needs to; each reads what the others left behind: a permit in flight, a state another changed, a claim another relied on. Those traces already live on the map. The record at w5 is where an agent leaves one, the estate at e2 and the knowledge at w2 are the medium the traces share, and the current state the check reads at w4 is their sum. So governing a cohort starts with governing the traces: who may leave one, with what standing, and who reads it before the next act. What emerges when many agents coordinate is a territory of its own. The set signals it here without drawing it; the reference model holds the question, and the seventh case draws the first step: a credit agent with two delegates, one chain of three, under one mandate and its two sub-mandates.
The reference model
What a regulated institution must be able to demonstrate before it lets an agent act. The reference model governs the delegated act, never the agent or the model alone: at the moment of commit, is this act defensible on this evidence? It is written for the second line first, the head of model risk, the CRO, and the chief data officer, with the people who have to take an agentic programme past them. It names no platform and certifies nothing.
It uses the term control plane in a strict sense, as the part that can refuse an act; describes the agent as a register row; sets out the points where an act is declared, authorised, assessed, committed or refused, and recorded, with the permit between authorisation and commit; pairs the levels of autonomy with the levels of evidence under the rule that autonomy may not rise above evidence; states the evidence conditions as artefacts a firm can show, among them the release manifest, the change classes, and the independence of whoever collects the evidence; lists the conditions still unmet for each agent, with an owner, an assessor, and whether each one blocks; and closes with a supervisory annex, dated and quoted exactly, and a worked example.
Much of this site already draws on it: the ladder on part three, the permit on part two, the decision rights on part four, and the way the workshop marks a map in two rounds. The model is the Hub’s outline, under review, with a first version planned for the fourth quarter of 2026; until then every level and every condition on this site is a proposal. Its slides, with a text beside them, are on the reference model page.
The research agenda
The questions the Hub works on next, each with a surface in this set that will carry the answer. The layer above one act: how cohorts of agents coordinate through traces, and what a control plane reads when no single mandate holds the limit; the reference model holds the question and the seventh case draws the first step. Standing a firm can trust: the set fixes the condition, that the check reads the standing of each claim at the second of the act, and producing that standing is the harder half. Who verifies an extracted clause, how a missing premise is found, what happens when two authorised sources disagree, and how a derived claim inherits the uncertainty of what it rests on are answered by implementation, as many as the Hub can run, at clients in different places, each on its own estate; no product in the September 2026 review reads standing at the commit. And the evidence conditions behind the ladder, K0 to K3, tested against the marks of workshops that mark the same boxes on the same scale, self-assessed marks compared with their scope and sample disclosed, which is the research use of the set.