Licence to Actthe control plane for AI agents
Research

Reading on governing AI agents, and where each piece meets the map.

This set is one line of the research programme of the Financial Services AI Enterprise Hub at Capgemini, on how a regulated firm delegates work to AI agents and keeps the licence to act in its own hands. The list is wide on purpose: research on governing agents and delegated authority, what supervisors and standards bodies expect, knowledge and provenance, coordination, where agents are going, and people and automation, with the Hub’s own papers among them. Each piece has one line on where it meets the map. The list stays open: to suggest a paper, write to the Hub. The empirical claims on this site, with their sources, are on the sources page.

The reading list

Work from the fields below, each checked against its publisher’s page in October 2026, with one line on where it meets the map. The figures quoted on this site are on the sources page.

Governing agents

Visibility into AI AgentsChan et al. · ACM FAccT 2024

Identifiers, real-time monitoring, and activity logs as the three levers of visibility; the set’s e1, p5, and w5, with the mandate added as the fourth.

Infrastructure for AI AgentsChan et al. · Transactions on Machine Learning Research, 2025

The systems outside the agent that attribute, shape, and remedy its actions; the control plane is one such infrastructure, inside one firm.

Practices for Governing Agentic AI SystemsShavit et al. · OpenAI, December 2023

The parties of the agent lifecycle and baseline practices for each; the set assigns those practices to boxes with owners.

Governing AI AgentsKolt · Notre Dame Law Review 101, 2026

Agents read through agency law and the principal-agent problem; the mandate on the map is a principal’s instruction made machine-readable.

AI Agents That MatterKapoor et al. · Transactions on Machine Learning Research, 2025

Agent benchmarks ignore cost and reproducibility; the set’s evaluations at p6 are run by a team that did not build the agent, with cost beside accuracy.

Stop Comparing LLM Agents Without Disclosing the HarnessZhang et al. · arXiv 2605.23950, May 2026

On a SWE-bench Verified subset the harness explained 7.8 times more variance than the model; so the firm approves a release, never a model (part three).

Harms from Increasingly Agentic Algorithmic SystemsChan et al. · ACM FAccT 2023

Agency as a matter of degree, with harms that grow as goals get less specified and impact more direct; why autonomy is granted level by level.

Characterizing AI Agents for Alignment and GovernanceKasirzadeh and Gabriel · arXiv 2504.21848, April 2025

Autonomy, efficacy, goal complexity, and generality as the dimensions of an agent; the labels of the ladder A.0 to A.5.

Fully Autonomous AI Agents Should Not be DevelopedMitchell, Ghosh, Luccioni, and Pistilli · arXiv 2502.02649, February 2025

The risks to people rise with each level of autonomy; A.5 is the level no evidence condition allows.

Dynamics Blindness: When AI Is Locally Correct and Globally Non-CompliantReichhart and Gelas · SSRN working paper, 2026

Why an agent can be right at every step and wrong as a whole: the failure the loop, the current-state input of the check, and situation card 5 are built against.

From Autonomy to Initiative: Enterprise AI’s Real EndgameReichhart and Gelas · SSRN working paper, 2026

Knowing, saying, and doing as layers of governance, and a circuit breaker that stops an act on a basis below standing: the check at w4.

Agentic Engineering ManifestoGelas · GitHub, 2026

How human-agent loops build software, with verified outcomes, auditable evidence, and verification gates: the release at w1, the harness at p1, evaluations at p6.

Delegated authority

Position: AI Agents Need Authenticated DelegationSouth et al. · ICML 2025, PMLR 267

Scoped, traceable authority granted by a person to an agent, on OAuth and OpenID; the set’s identity at p1 and entitlements at p3, under the mandate at w3.

Software and AI Agent Identity and Authorization, concept paperNIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence · NIST, February 2026

Existing identity and authorization standards applied to agents; the platform row of the map in a standards body’s words.

Control Overlays for Securing AI Systems, concept paperNIST · NIST SP 800-53 overlays, August 2025

Five overlays on SP 800-53, two of them for single-agent and multi-agent systems; the platform controls the set leaves to the CISO.

Not What You’ve Signed Up For: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt InjectionGreshake et al. · ACM AISec 2023

Instructions planted in what an agent retrieves take over what it does; why the check reads the act and its basis itself, whatever the agent declares.

OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications, 2025 editionOWASP Gen AI Security Project · OWASP, November 2024

Prompt injection and excessive agency at the head of the practitioners’ list (LLM01 and LLM06); the guardrails at p4 and the entitlements at p3.

Supervisors on AI in finance

The Financial Stability Implications of Artificial IntelligenceFinancial Stability Board · FSB, November 2024

Third-party dependence, concentration, and cyber risk as the system-level questions; the set stays inside one firm and names those as the layer above it.

Regulating AI in the financial sector: recent developments and main challengesCrisanto, Leuterio, Prenio, and Yong · BIS FSI Insights 63, December 2024

Governance, model risk, data, and third parties as the gaps supervisors see; four of the set’s essentials, with the mandate and the loop missing from the list.

Opinion on Artificial Intelligence governance and risk managementEIOPA · EIOPA, August 2025

How existing insurance rules apply to AI, proportionately; the row of part four’s law slide that the motor case reads.

AI Act: implications for the EU banking and payments sectorEuropean Banking Authority · EBA, November 2025

The AI Act’s high-risk rules set against banking law, with no significant contradiction found; the ground for the credit cases’ law rows.

Artificial Intelligence in Capital Markets: Use Cases, Risks, and ChallengesIOSCO · Consultation Report CR/01/2025, March 2025

Securities supervisors on AI in trading, advice, and operations, and the risks they see; the ground for the capital-markets case, beside the EBA’s view for banks.

The rise of artificial intelligence: benefits and risks for financial stabilityLeitner, Singh, van der Kraaij, and Zsámboki · ECB Financial Stability Review, May 2024

Firm-level benefits and risks and how they become systemic; the firm-level half is what the map governs.

SS1/23: Model risk management principles for banksPrudential Regulation Authority · Bank of England, 2023, current version April 2026

Model identification, governance, development, validation, and risk mitigants; model risk validates the release at w1 and the evaluations at p6.

SR 26-2: Revised Guidance on Model Risk ManagementFederal Reserve, OCC, and FDIC · April 2026, superseding SR 11-7

A risk-based approach to model risk that leaves generative and agentic AI to the bank’s own risk management; the register quotes the footnote (row 10).

Standards, audit, and assurance

Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0)NIST · NIST AI 100-1, January 2023

Govern, map, measure, and manage as the functions of AI risk management; the enterprise row of the map in a framework’s words.

ISO/IEC 42001:2023, Artificial intelligence: Management systemISO and IEC · December 2023

A management system for AI that can be certified; the owners, the register, and the reviews on the map, as an auditor of the standard would sample them.

Closing the AI Accountability Gap: Defining an End-to-End Framework for Internal Algorithmic AuditingRaji et al. · ACM FAT* 2020

An end-to-end framework for internal algorithmic audit; the evidence base at e5 and the record at w5 are what such an audit samples.

Auditing large language models: a three-layered approachMökander, Schuett, Kirk, and Floridi · AI and Ethics 4, 2024

Governance, model, and application audits as three layers; the map’s three rows, audited in turn.

Knowledge, provenance, and retrieval

PROV-DM: The PROV Data ModelMoreau and Missier, eds. · W3C Recommendation, 2013

Entities, activities, and agents as the grammar of provenance; the first thing a claim carries, in a standard’s terms.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP TasksLewis et al. · NeurIPS 2020

Retrieval paired with generation; what p2 does, and what the set says it cannot do alone: find the version that applies.

Lost in the Middle: How Language Models Use Long ContextsLiu et al. · Transactions of the ACL 12, 2024

Models read the start and the end of a long input and lose the middle; why the agent receives a bounded package of claims and never the library.

Fact or Fiction: Verifying Scientific ClaimsWadden et al. · EMNLP 2020

A claim checked against evidence that supports or refutes it; the claim grain, in the literature where it was first worked at scale.

Measuring Attribution in Natural Language Generation ModelsRashkin et al. · Computational Linguistics 49, 2023

Whether a generated statement is attributable to an identified source; the test the record at w5 answers for every premise of an act.

Survey of Hallucination in Natural Language GenerationJi et al. · ACM Computing Surveys 55, 2023

Why fluent output is no evidence; the record keeps the claims an act relied on, and never the model’s prose as a source.

Unifying Large Language Models and Knowledge Graphs: A RoadmapPan et al. · IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering 36, 2024

Language models and knowledge graphs combined; the knowledge estate at e2 as structured, versioned claims beside the model.

Governed Intelligence Architecture for Institutional AIGelas and Reichhart · SSRN working paper, 2026

The lifecycle that keeps knowledge fit to act on, the decay classes, and why a model’s own output never re-enters as an independent source: chapter 05, how knowledge is prepared.

The Knowledge Layer: A Reference Architecture for Delegated AI Action in Regulated InstitutionsReichhart and Gelas · Zenodo, 2026

The claim and its standing on two axes, admissibility computed per act against the consequence tier’s bar, and the signed manifest: the set’s second rule.

Ontology Governance in Claim-Level ArchitecturesGelas and Reichhart · Zenodo, 2026

The type system beneath the claims, and how it stays versionable and transferable between domains.

Intelligence Governance ManifestoReichhart and Gelas · 2026

Governed claims over stored documents, traceable provenance over trusted sources, and preserved contradictions over forced consensus: the values behind chapter 05.

Coordination above one act

The interdisciplinary study of coordinationMalone and Crowston · ACM Computing Surveys 26, 1994

Coordination as the management of dependencies between activities; what a cohort of agents needs once no single mandate holds the limit.

A Brief History of StigmergyTheraulaz and Bonabeau · Artificial Life 5, 1999

Insects coordinating through the traces their work leaves behind; the record at w5 and the knowledge at w2 as the medium agents read.

Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AIHammond et al. · Cooperative AI Foundation, Technical Report 1, February 2025

Miscoordination, conflict, and collusion among agents as distinct risks; the cohorts and cascades the map does not draw yet.

Cognition in the WildHutchins · MIT Press, 1995

Navigation on a ship as cognition spread across people, instruments, and records; the record and the register as part of how a firm thinks.

The Predictive Organization: Architecture for Enterprise IntelligenceGelas and Reichhart · SSRN working paper, 2026

Organisational intelligence as map, physics, and player: the frame around the knowledge plane.

Build the Medium: Why Organizational Intelligence Is Mechanism, Not MetaphorReichhart and Gelas · SSRN working paper, 2026

Intelligence as a property of the medium the units coordinate through: what the loop at w6 feeds, and what lies above one act.

Agentic Enterprise ManifestoReichhart and Gelas · 2026

Accountability scoped by consequence class, and containment as multi-agent: e1, e4, p4, and w6, and what the map does not draw yet.

Where the agents are going

A Path Towards Autonomous Machine IntelligenceLeCun · OpenReview, June 2022

Agents that plan by predicting the consequences of their acts in a learned world model; the fifth card of what the map does not draw yet.

Self-Supervised Learning from Images with a Joint-Embedding Predictive ArchitectureAssran et al. · CVPR 2023

I-JEPA, the first of the line; a predicted consequence enters the check as one more claim with a standing.

Revisiting Feature Prediction for Learning Visual Representations from VideoBardes et al. · Transactions on Machine Learning Research, 2024

V-JEPA, the same idea on video; the map does not move when the architecture does.

People and automation

A model for types and levels of human interaction with automationParasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens · IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 30, 2000

Four stages and ten levels of automation; the ancestor of every autonomy ladder, the set’s A.0 to A.5 included (A.5 as the end no evidence condition allows).

Ironies of automationBainbridge · Automatica 19, 1983

The more a system is automated, the more skilled and less practised its supervisor; the people slide of part four, forty years early.

Trust in Automation: Designing for Appropriate RelianceLee and See · Human Factors 46, 2004

Reliance calibrated to what automation can actually do; the standing an act needs is set by its consequence, never by the agent’s confidence.

Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Systems: A Philosophical AccountSantoni de Sio and van den Hoven · Frontiers in Robotics and AI 5, 2018

Control that tracks human reasons and traces to a responsible person; the mandate with a named owner, and the record that names who decided.

The flaws of policies requiring human oversight of government algorithmsGreen · Computer Law & Security Review 45, 2022

Forty-one oversight policies that ask a person to catch what a person cannot; why the set makes human in the loop two jobs, deciding referrals and reviewing samples.

The ladder

The levels of autonomy A.0 to A.5 descend from the levels of automation of Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens, and their labels are from Kasirzadeh and Gabriel (Nature, August 2026). Pairing each with a level of evidence, K0 to K3, under the rule that autonomy may not rise above evidence, and listing the overhang as the conditions not yet met, each with an owner, an assessor, and whether it blocks, is the set’s own proposal, under review for the reference model, and not yet shown to predict acceptable risk.

Above one act

What the map does not draw yet are agents delegating, cohorts, cascades, other firms’ agents coordinating through the traces they leave, and agents built to predict the consequences of their own acts. The first four belong to the literature on coordination listed above, and the fifth to the world-model line of work. Around an agent an institution builds three things: the medium the units coordinate through, the membranes that test what an act depends on, and a sizing rule that grants no mandate larger than the organisation around it can absorb, check, and correct.

Delegation: one agent hands work to another, and the questions are whose mandate the second acts under, which check reads it, and whether the record of the first names the second. Cohorts: several agents on one process, each inside its own limit, together over a limit none of them holds; three elections on one issuer is the case in the situation cards. Cascades: one agent changes the state another reasons over, and a third’s act conflicts with both, so nothing any one of them did was wrong and the firm’s position is. And the agent’s own foresight: today’s agents infer the next token, and the next ones are being built to carry a world model, like JEPA, and to plan an act by predicting what it will do. The map does not move for that. A predicted consequence enters the check as one more claim with a standing, and the record keeps what the agent expected beside what happened.

The first four coordinate the way ants and termites do, through traces. No agent sees the whole picture and none needs to; each reads what the others left behind: a permit in flight, a state another changed, a claim another relied on. Those traces already live on the map. The record at w5 is where an agent leaves one, the estate at e2 and the knowledge at w2 are the medium the traces share, and the current state the check reads at w4 is their sum. So governing a cohort starts with governing the traces: who may leave one, with what standing, and who reads it before the next act. What emerges when many agents coordinate is a territory of its own. The set signals it here without drawing it; the reference model holds the question, and the seventh case draws the first step: a credit agent with two delegates, one chain of three, under one mandate and its two sub-mandates.

The reference model

What a regulated institution must be able to demonstrate before it lets an agent act. The reference model governs the delegated act, never the agent or the model alone: at the moment of commit, is this act defensible on this evidence? It is written for the second line first, the head of model risk, the CRO, and the chief data officer, with the people who have to take an agentic programme past them. It names no platform and certifies nothing.

It uses the term control plane in a strict sense, as the part that can refuse an act; describes the agent as a register row; sets out the points where an act is declared, authorised, assessed, committed or refused, and recorded, with the permit between authorisation and commit; pairs the levels of autonomy with the levels of evidence under the rule that autonomy may not rise above evidence; states the evidence conditions as artefacts a firm can show, among them the release manifest, the change classes, and the independence of whoever collects the evidence; lists the conditions still unmet for each agent, with an owner, an assessor, and whether each one blocks; and closes with a supervisory annex, dated and quoted exactly, and a worked example.

Much of this site already draws on it: the ladder on part three, the permit on part two, the decision rights on part four, and the way the workshop marks a map in two rounds. The model is the Hub’s outline, under review, with a first version planned for the fourth quarter of 2026; until then every level and every condition on this site is a proposal. Its slides, with a text beside them, are on the reference model page.

The research agenda

The questions the Hub works on next, each with a surface in this set that will carry the answer. The layer above one act: how cohorts of agents coordinate through traces, and what a control plane reads when no single mandate holds the limit; the reference model holds the question and the seventh case draws the first step. Standing a firm can trust: the set fixes the condition, that the check reads the standing of each claim at the second of the act, and producing that standing is the harder half. Who verifies an extracted clause, how a missing premise is found, what happens when two authorised sources disagree, and how a derived claim inherits the uncertainty of what it rests on are answered by implementation, as many as the Hub can run, at clients in different places, each on its own estate; no product in the September 2026 review reads standing at the commit. And the evidence conditions behind the ladder, K0 to K3, tested against the marks of workshops that mark the same boxes on the same scale, self-assessed marks compared with their scope and sample disclosed, which is the research use of the set.